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Abstract
We present a simple model of status-seeking over multiple socioeco-
nomic domains by introducing the concept of conspicuous health as
an argument in the utility function, in addition to the well-established
conspicuous consumption term. We explore the implications of such
a utility function for optimal income taxation, where we show an in-
crease in concerns for conspicuous health to have an opposite effect on
the marginal tax rate, compared to an increase in concerns for conspic-
uous consumption. Using life satisfaction panel data from Australia,
along with an improved measure of exogenous reference groups (that
accounts for the ‘time era’ of respondents), we find evidence of a com-
parison health effect.
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1 Introduction
Often when individuals are asked about their general health level at any given
point in time, the typical response is something along the lines: ‘It could be
better’, or, ‘It could be worse’. Although such a response may be regarded as
everyday convention, it nevertheless implies some notion of a health compar-
ison to a reference level (for example, to oneself at an earlier point in time,
or to other individuals familiar to the respondent). Moreover, people have
always been known to compare their physical state or appearance such as
beauty, height and weight to others they might know, hear about, or view
on television, for example.1 Thereby, individuals are bound to experience a
positive shock (presumably of relief or, in some cases, pride and self-esteem)
from knowing that they are better looking, taller, fitter or healthier than
relevant others in society.
Within the economics literature, the role of relative concerns, or inter-
dependent preferences, in explaining individual choice behaviour has been
studied quite extensively in recent times (see Clark et al. 2008). The main
focus has been on status effects arising from relative consumption (or in-
come), usually defined as the ratio of own consumption to reference group
or comparison consumption. The large number of studies using relative con-
sumption as an argument in the utility function has lead researchers to view
consumption as the premier signal of social status that individuals demand.
As a result, little is currently known about the empirical importance and
public policy implications of other social comparisons, i.e. the pursuit of
status in other or multiple socioeconomic domains (see Veblen 1899; Layard
1980).2
In this paper we present a simple theoretical model of status-seeking
over multiple socioeconomic domains by introducing the concept of conspic-
uous health as an argument in the utility function, in addition to the well-
1See Eckel and Petrie (2011) and Hamermesh (2011) for an overview of the importance
of physical appearance on socioeconomic outcomes within society.
2A notable exception has been the leisure domain, first highlighted by Veblen (1899),
and empirically examined by a number of recent studies, including Pingle and Mitchell
(2002), Alpizar et al. (2005), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), and
Frijters and Leigh (2009). Most of the studies find relative leisure to be of importance
for individual well-being and choice behaviour, however less positional than income or
consumption. Moreover, Layard (1980) makes note of other non-material domains where
relative concerns are also of importance such as effort, education, and sporting ability, i.e.
the presence of simultaneous status races.
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established conspicuous consumption term. We hypothesise utility to be
increasing in own health and decreasing in comparison health. Individuals
are assumed to experience a negative utility shock as others in their social
reference group become healthier; for instance, as relevant others increase
health inputs such as physical exercise, or reduce their alcohol and cigarette
consumption. Thus, individuals envy the health of others, or feel a sense
of personal relief as the health level of others deteriorates. Analogous to
the literature on relative income or conspicuous consumption, this implies
that an individual’s relative health confers social status, where the ‘status
return’ from increased health may come from both a direct warm-glow of
perceiving oneself to be more successful in a domain (a direct status effect),
as well as from indirect increases in other final goods that come with higher
status. These indirect advantages include superior mating partners, a better
occupation or job title, enhanced social networks and social respect.3
We explore the implications of a utility function that includes a role for
relative health concerns in terms of equilibrium labour choices and optimal
income taxation, where we find an increase in concerns for conspicuous health
to reduce the rationale for higher marginal taxation.4
The present paper is motivated by and adds to two main streams of lit-
erature; namely, the recent literature on status effects in health, and the
rather scarce literature on multiple or simultaneous status races. Our focus
on status-seeking in personal health is partly motivated by a few recent stud-
ies that relate individual utility to relative physical appearance and fitness.
For example, using a similar framework to Oswald and Powdthavee (2007),
Blanchflower et al. (2009) consider utility to be relative in people’s body
weight, or obesity, as measured by the body mass index (BMI). The authors
find some empirical support for a relative obesity effect in Germany.5 Clark
and Etile´ (2011) test for social interactions in BMI between spouses, and find
3For more detailed discussions about the economic and social value of status, and its
importance for market behaviour; see, for example, Ball and Eckel (1998), Becker and
Murphy (2000), Ball et al. (2001), and Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson (2006).
4Several theoretical studies have explored the optimal tax implications of conspicuous
consumption; see e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Layard (1980), Oswald (1983), Frank
(1985), Ireland (1998), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), Abel
(2005), Wedner and Goulder (2008), and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008).
5However, the reported results and derived conclusions in Blanchflower et al. (2009) are
somewhat inconsistent. In their Table 3 (on page 535), the authors report a clear negative
effect of ‘relative BMI’ on individual life satisfaction (from fixed-effect estimation), however
conclude that ‘relative BMI’ enters positively (the a priori direction).
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the effect of own BMI on individual well-being to depend on partner BMI,
suggesting the presence of social contagion effects in physical weight.
In another study, Carrell et al. (2011) use a novel data set consisting
of interactions between randomly assigned college students from the US Air
Force Academy to study the effect of peer fitness on (own) individual fitness.
The authors find that subjects do attempt to mimic the fitness levels of their
peers, with the probability of failing a basic fitness test increasing by threefold
when around fifty per cent of one’s friends become out-of-shape. While the
study does not directly model a utility function with a relative fitness term,
it does appeal to such a motivation by arguing that an individual’s desire
to become fit depends on the fitness of their peer. The motivation is subtly
different from ours in that the authors implicitly presume the strength of
concern for fitness itself to increase if one’s peers become fitter, which is
more of an endogenous identity effect rather than a relativity effect.
At the same time, only a handful of studies have explicitly considered util-
ity functions with multiple status effects. For example, Frijters and Leigh
(2009) study a society where social competition over visible consumption
and leisure is present. The importance of conspicuous leisure is assumed
to decrease in the resident turnover rate of a given neighbourhood, thus
leading the ‘stayers’ to substitute toward signalling their relative consump-
tion. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2012) provide a theoretical study
on optimal income taxation when the importance of relative consumption
depends on leisure, where the authors interpret Veblen’s (1899) arguments
on leisure to imply that conspicuous consumption becomes more visible and
thus more salient for relative utility when leisure increases. The authors
base their analysis on the Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) ‘two-type’ opti-
mal income taxation model, where informational asymmetries exist between
the social planner and private sector households. Broadly similar to our
findings, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman find an increase in concerns for
relative consumption to have a positive effect on marginal income tax rates,
and better positionality in the relative leisure domain to entail the opposite
effect (for particular individual-ability types). The main difference within our
framework is that we allow for two relative goods (consumption and health)
rather than one good to be endogenous.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the
theoretical model, where we study optimal tax policy responses when agents
engage in multiple status-races in society. Section 3 provides a short empirical
application, where we estimate the importance of relative concerns about
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private health and consumption using household survey data from Australia.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a society with n individuals, two private goods, and a pure
public good. The representative individual has preferences over private con-
sumption k, private health h, and a public good G; which includes public
health goods. In addition, individuals care about their social status across
multiple domains, comparing themselves to an exogenous level of consump-
tion and health denoted by k˜ and h˜, respectively. Utility is assumed to take
the quasi-linear form
u = a ln k + b ln
(
k/k˜
)
+ c lnh+ d ln
(
h/h˜
)
+ e ln(1− lw − lh) +G (1)
where k/k˜ and h/h˜ denote the relative (conspicuous) levels of consumption
and health, respectively. The utility weights a and c measure the direct
effects from private consumption and private health. On the other hand,
b and d signify the status effects from consumption and health, where the
‘status return’ from increased health may come in the form of superior mating
partners, a better occupation or job title, enhanced social networks and social
respect. The relative magnitudes of b and d can alternatively be viewed as
representing the relative intensity of each status race; where, for example,
b/d = 1 implies equal intensity.
Private consumption is defined as k = ω(1−τ)lw, where lw ∈ [0, 1] denotes
labour work hours; ω is the wage rate of labour (assumed to be homogenous
across individuals); and τ is the marginal tax rate on income. An individual’s
private health level is given by h = h0 + ψlh, where h0 denotes the initial
(genetic) health endowment; lh ∈ [0, 1] is the amount of hours spent on health
enhancing activities such as physical exercise; and ψ captures the return to
private health from each hour allocated to such activity. Finally, the leisure
term 1−lw−lh decreases in the number of work and health production hours.
Individuals maximise utility function (1) by choosing lw and lh, resulting
in the following first-order conditions
a+ b
lw
=
e
1− lw − lh (2)
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(c+ d)ψ
h0 + ψlh
=
e
1− lw − lh (3)
Solving equations (2) and (3) simultaneously for an interior solution, we
arrive at the chosen number of work and health production hours
l∗w =
(a+ b)(ψ + h0)
(a+ b+ c+ d+ e)ψ
(4)
l∗h =
(c+ d)ψ − (a+ b+ e)h0
(a+ b+ c+ d+ e)ψ
(5)
From the above, we can infer that an interior solution requires (c+d)ψ >
(a+ b+e)h0; for otherwise the exogenous health level is so high that individ-
uals no longer have an incentive to invest positive time amounts into their
health.
2.0.1 Comparative Statics
From the point of view of the individual, the most interesting aspects of this
solution are the comparative statics. We present some of these below:
dl∗w
db
=
(c+ d+ e)(ψ + h0)
ψ(a+ b+ c+ d+ e)2
> 0 (6)
dl∗w
dd
=
−(a+ b)(ψ + h0)
ψ(a+ b+ c+ d+ e)2
< 0 (7)
dl∗h
dd
=
(a+ b+ e)(ψ + h0)
ψ(a+ b+ c+ d+ e)2
> 0 (8)
dl∗h
db
=
−(c+ d)(ψ + h0)
ψ(a+ b+ c+ d+ e)2
< 0 (9)
The result in (6) gives the prediction that hours spent on labour produc-
tion will increase as the importance of conspicuous consumption increases;
that is, as the status race in consumption intensifies. On the other hand, as
expected, work hours decrease in the concern for conspicuous health (equa-
tion 7). Result (8) leads to the prediction that time spent on health improving
activities, such as going to the gym, increases as the importance of conspic-
uous health rises. And, finally, result (9) states that as the status race in
consumption intensifies, people spend less time maintaining and showing off
their health.
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2.1 Optimal Taxation and Multiple Status Effects
Suppose the social planner’s objective is to maximise the following utilitarian
social welfare function
W (u1, ..., un) =
n∑
i=1
ui ≡ nu (10)
where ui denotes the utility of individual household i ∈ {1, .., n}. The last
part of the expression results from the initial assumption of preference and
wage homogeneity among individuals. The social planner knows that each
member of society faces the same utility function, and hence that it is im-
possible for the representative individual to improve her relative position in
a status race. That is, the representative individual enjoys average consump-
tion, k = k˜ = k, and average health, h = h˜ = h, (and status) in equilibrium.
Since both k/k˜ and h/h˜ are equal to 1, the social planner maximises a re-
duced version of utility function (1),
u = a ln k + c lnh+ e ln(1− lw − lh) +G (11)
where the relative consumption and relative health terms disappear due to
the logarithm of 1 being zero. The planner maximises (11) subject to the
balanced budget constraint
τωlw = G (12)
as well as the private sector solutions, (4) and (5), for the amount of work
and health enhancing hours. The solution for the optimal tax rate, τ ∗, is
then obtained by substituting the above constraints into (11), and solving
the first-order condition for
τ ∗ =
a(ωh0 − aψ) + b(h0 + ψ)ω − aψ(a+ b+ c+ d+ e− ω)
(a+ b)(h0 + ψ)ω
(13)
2.1.1 Comparative Statics
The main question for the social planner is: What happens to τ ∗ as concerns
for relative consumption and relative health (parameters b and d) increase in
society? The answer is given by the comparative statics:
dτ ∗
db
=
aψ(c+ d+ e)
(a+ b)2(ψ + h0)ω
> 0 (14)
dτ ∗
dd
=
−aψ
(a+ b)(ψ + h0)ω
< 0 (15)
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where a higher marginal tax rate on labour income prevails as the status
race in consumption intensifies (equation 14), a finding that is consistent with
existing theoretical literature on optimal nonlinear taxation.6 The intuition is
that a greater degree of concern for relative consumption (higher b) increases
the amount of effort individuals allocate to earning more income, which in
turn increases the benefits of higher taxation for the provision of the public
good, G. The greater amount of own consumption relative to leisure increases
the negative externality on others (as their social rank declines), giving the
social planner an added incentive to promote leisure by increasing income
taxation (see e.g., Frank 1985).
On the other hand, the novel result in (15) suggests that increased com-
petition and envy in the health domain leads to a lower optimal marginal
tax rate in society. This is due to individual households substituting work
hours (lw) for health production hours (lh) which reduces the marginal ben-
efits of taxation to the social planner. Since we can interpret G to include
public health expenditures, the result also states that increased concerns for
conspicuous health reduce the importance of public health goods.
The model thus predicts that positional concerns need not necessarily
lead to higher optimal taxes. It does not even have to be true that an overall
increase in relative concerns (b+d) increases taxation: in the knife-edge case,
when (a+ b) = (c+d+e), the two marginal tax rates are equal in magnitude
and an equal increase in parameters b and d would cancel out, maintaining
the equality above.7
3 Empirical Application
In this section we estimate the intensity of each status race, that is, the
importance of relative concerns about private consumption and health in
society. The data we use come from the first nine waves of the Household,
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. HILDA is a
household-based panel study which started in 2001, with the latest data
6See studies cited in footnote 4.
7A possible further extension to the simple model above is to specify labour income
(hence consumption) as an increasing function of personal health k(h) where kh > 0.
Hence, as individuals become healthier they are able to work harder and also become
more productive. While such an addition may capture some observable facts from the
labour market, it leads to indeterminacy in the comparative statics.
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release at this time being in 2011. Interviews have been conducted annually
with members of each household who are at least fifteen years of age.8 There
are 101, 050 person-year observations corresponding to 19, 270 individuals.
3.1 Data and Specification
The outcome variable used to proxy individual utility is self-reported life
satisfaction. Life satisfaction is measured annually using responses to the
following question: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your
life?” Respondents are informed to: “Pick a number between 0 and 10 to
indicate how satisfied you are. The more satisfied you are, the higher number
you should pick. The less satisfied you are, the lower the number.” The re-
sponses to this question follow a negatively skewed distribution, with a mode
and median equal to 8. More than 85 per cent of the surveyed individu-
als report a life satisfaction value of 7 or above. We estimate the following
(baseline) life satisfaction equation:
lsit = α lnhit + β ln h˜it + γ ln yit + δ ln y˜it + ηzit + νi + µit (16)
where lsit is the life satisfaction of person i in period t; hit denotes absolute
health; h˜it is the reference or peer level of health; yit is absolute disposable
income from all sources, a proxy for private consumption; y˜it is reference
income; and zit is a vector of other socioeconomic and demographic explana-
tory variables such as age, gender, years of education, marital status, and
government non-income social support expenditures; νi denotes an individ-
ual unobserved effect that is constant over time, such as cognitive ability
and motivation; and µit is an iid random error term.
9 We hypothesise life
satisfaction (and utility) to be increasing in own income and own health (α >
0, γ > 0), and decreasing in comparison income and comparison health (β <
0, δ < 0). Thereby, individuals are expected to experience a negative shock
to happiness as others from their social reference group become healthier or
wealthier, or both.
8For a detailed description of the HILDA survey, see Watson and Wooden (2002).
9We consider both cardinal and ordinal views of individual utility, and hence make
the following assumptions: (i) individuals are willing and able to answer life satisfaction
questions; (ii) reported life satisfaction, or happiness, is related to the concept of utility;
and (iii) responses are cardinally comparable, that is, the satisfaction difference between
a 4 and a 6 is the same as the difference between an 8 and a 10, and so on. For a review
of different methodologies in analysing happiness data, see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters
(2004).
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The variable used to define individual health is based on answers to the
following question: “In general, would you say your health is: poor, fair,
good, very good, or excellent,” with the possible responses coded as 1 (poor)
to 5 (excellent). The mean response to this self-assessed health question is
3.4, with more than 80 per cent choosing 3 or above.
3.1.1 Measuring Peer Health
We derive the reference or peer health variable using the cell mean approach,
where social reference groups comprise individuals of similar demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics such as age, gender, education, and ge-
ographical region.10 After respondents are grouped into ‘cells’, the mean
value of the socioeconomic variable of interest is computed as the reference
or comparison point (see e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996; McBride 2001; Ferrer-
i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005; Vendrik and Woltjer 2007).
We extend the existing cell-mean methodology by taking the ‘time era’
of responses into account, as otherwise respondents are taken to compare
themselves to others of similar attributes from much earlier and later survey
waves (that could be several years or even decades apart). When one does
not take time era into account, such as in the studies of McBride (2001)
and Vendrik and Woltjer (2007), one groups respondents who are of similar
recorded age, but who have lived in totally different time periods and whom
are quite unlikely to consider each other as peers.
We thus compute the cell mean of self-assessed general health for a set
of reference groups, where each group contains individuals of similar age,
gender, education level, geographical region, and time era. We divide age
into six groups: (i) 25 or younger, (ii) between 26 and 35, (iii) between 36
and 45, (iv) between 46 and 55, (v) between 56 and 65, and (vi) older than
65. Similarly, education is categorised according to the number of years at
school: less than 10, 10, 11, 12, and more than 12. The regions correspond to
the 8 states/territories in Australia: New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland,
South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory, and Aus-
tralian Capital Territory. Additionally, to capture the time dimension of peer
groups, we sort respondents by survey wave (9 waves in total). This process
results in 4320 different and exogenous reference groups. We calculate the
10The comparison or peer income variable is constructed using the same cell mean
approach.
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average self-assessed health level for each group and match the correspond-
ing value to each member. It should be also noted that an individual’s own
health level is excluded when computing his or her cell mean.
Prior to estimating the above life satisfaction regressions, it is impor-
tant to understand that any identified relations between individual and peer
group outcomes cannot be interpreted as strictly causal. The main reason
is that people residing in the same region are exposed to identical economic
and environmental constraints, such as prices for goods and services, and dis-
tance to fast-food outlets, recreation parks and fitness centres, for example.
Such common unobserved contextual factors make it difficult to separately
estimate peer effects from the common circumstances and changes affecting
both individuals and their peers. Another related problem is that we are
making a particular assumption as to whom the peers are (those in the same
cell), and that deviations from these exogenously defined peer groups would
invite measurement error in the peer variables.
3.2 Results
Table 1 presents the estimation results. For completeness, we treat life sat-
isfaction both as a cardinal (columns 2 to 6) and ordinal (columns 7 to 9)
measure. The coefficient on ln(own health) is significant and positive, con-
firming that individuals feel happier as their health levels improve. At the
same time, the coefficient estimate on ln(reference health) is highly signifi-
cant and negative, suggesting that people are less satisfied with their lives
as their peers become healthier, i.e. the presence of a comparison health
effect. This finding is consistent across all three methodologies and empirical
models. The absolute magnitudes of the two coefficients are not very similar,
rejecting the hypothesis that utility is totally relative in health.11 Thus, a
11The log-linear specification in (16) is equivalent to
lsit = α lnhit + β ln
(
hit/h˜it
)
+ γ ln yit + δ ln (yit/y˜it) + ηzit + νi + µit
≡ α lnhit + β
(
lnhit − ln h˜it
)
+ γ ln yit + δ (ln yit − ln y˜it) + ηzit + νi + µit
≡ (α+ β) lnhit − β ln h˜it + (γ + δ) ln yit − δ ln y˜it + ηzit + νi + µit
As the estimated coefficient on own health corresponds to α̂ + β̂, and that on comparison
health to β̂, the finding that the coefficients are statistically equal and opposite is then
consistent with a fully relative utility function. That is, the benefit from an additional
unit of absolute health is effectively zero, α = 0. A similar result holds for the income
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higher level of absolute health in society does raise the average happiness
of individuals. Moreover, own health (on average) plays a greater role in
people’s lives compared to peer health, with the magnitude of the estimated
coefficient on the former being roughly about twice as large in most of the
estimated models.
In terms of the importance of income (or ‘broad’ consumption) for life sat-
isfaction, we find a significant and positive effect of absolute income on peo-
ple’s happiness, and a significant and negative effect of peer income. These
results are consistent with the empirical literature on ‘reference effects’ (see
Van de Stadt et al. 1985; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005; Vendrik
and Woltjer 2007; Knight and Gunatilaka 2011; Akay et al. 2012; Corazzini
et al. 2012).
There is also robust evidence of gender differences in relative concerns,
with women being more sensitive to the health levels of their peers than
men, and males being primarily more interested in competing over mone-
tary income, or material goods, with others from their reference group. This
is especially true in the fixed effects equations (for both the cardinal and
ordinal treatments). The latter gender-specific result is consistent with Dar-
winian views on natural fitness and reproduction (see Frank 2011). On the
other hand, finding the intensity of the status race in health to be higher
among women (than men) supports the recent literature on comparison BMI
effects, where, for example, Clark and Etile´ (2011) find females to experience
a relatively greater decrease in well-being as they become fatter than their
partner.
Overall, there is sufficient evidence that people compete with others in
the personal health domain, even more so than over monetary income (the
magnitude of relative health coefficient is consistently greater than that of
relative income, across all empirical models).
A potential issue that could bias our findings is the presence of multi-
collinearity. This is due to some of the explanatory variables, namely age
and education, being also used to construct the social comparison variables.
To test for this problem, we estimated the equations from Table 1 without
either age or education, or both. Omitting any of the two variables does not
cause major changes to the coefficient magnitudes and their significance in
any of the models (as above, own health and own income effects are positive
and significant, and reference health and reference income effects are negative
variable.
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and significant).12 We can interpret these robustness findings as a sign that
the health of the peer group differs sufficiently from a linear combination of
own variables (age, health, income, gender, time) to separately identify the
relative health effects.
3.2.1 Reference Group Variations
Finally, the definition of the peer group that we employ (and in our view,
the ‘true’ definition) implies an average group size of 4.5 individuals. It
could however be argued that actual reference groups should consist of a
greater number of peers. To this end, we perform two additional estima-
tion/robustness exercises, redefining the peer group each time.
In the first augmentation, we allow individuals to compare with both
sexes (males and females), hence removing groupings by gender. This is also
the baseline definition of reference groups used by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005).
The resulting estimates are shown in Table 2 of Appendix A.
As expected, there is a general increase in the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients on ln(reference health) across all three estimation methods, with
no changes in the direction of comparison (envy over peer income and health
still prevails). Based on the t-statistic β1−β2√
σ21+σ
2
2
, this difference is however not
statistically significant.
In the second peer group variation, we remove the ‘time era’ component
of social comparisons (leading to an average group size of 40.15 individuals).
That is, individuals are now assumed to compare with relevant others from
each survey wave as the time difference between waves is fully discounted
from the analysis. Such an exercise tests the plausibility of our key method-
ological argument from Section 3.1.1 above; that the peer group variable
should be constructed to include the ‘time era’ of social comparisons. If
this is not the case, then individuals are unrealistically taken to compare
themselves with others who have responded even decades apart. The corre-
sponding coefficient estimates are presented in Table 3 of Appendix A.
The general findings support our proposed definition with the effect of the
ln(reference income) variable becoming statistically insignificant and posi-
tive across all of the main specifications. Thus, the inclusion of a time era
constraint in the definition of reference groups leads to more plausible be-
havioural parameters.
12These results are available upon request from the authors.
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4 Conclusion
This paper studied a simple model of status-seeking over multiple socioe-
conomic domains, namely conspicuous consumption and conspicuous health,
and the apparent implications for public policy. We showed that an increase
in concerns for conspicuous consumption has the well-established positive ef-
fect on the optimal income tax rate, where individuals are made to internalise
the negative externality placed on others from increased own consumption
(due to the reduced social status experienced by others). Such comparative
statics reduce the social cost of redistribution as income taxes internalise the
externalities arising from conspicuous consumption.
On the other hand, we showed that increased social competition in the
personal health domain (that is, a higher concern for relative health) has
an offsetting role by leading to a decrease in optimal taxation: a greater
concern for conspicuous health leads to an overconsumption of health that
reduces the available time for other activities. In the model presented, this
health overconsumption is implicitly taxed by reducing taxation on labour
time. An equivalent interpretation is that an increase in conspicuous health
reduces the need for public goods (such as public health) and as such conveys
a positive externality on the public purse.
We then introduced an empirical definition of exogenous reference groups
that controls for the time period of respondents within the survey panel, and
tested for the presence of comparison consumption and health effects using
life satisfaction data from Australia. There is evidence that individuals envy
both the income and health level of their peers. Absolute health was found
to matter more than peer health, however the latter factor is of notable
importance for individual happiness. Moreover, women seem to care more
about relative health than men, whilst men were found to care more about
relative income (or consumption).
The finding that individuals engage in simultaneous status races in health
and income gives a more complex picture of optimal health policy: as con-
spicuous displays of health become a prevalent means of obtaining status in
society, the argument for taxing conspicuous consumption via income tax
reduces as well as the need for public health provision because individuals
themselves invest more in health. On the other hand, conspicuous health is
itself a source of inequality, which leads to the question of whether it can be
redistributed.
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Table 1: Life Satisfaction Equatons: Hilda Survey 2001−2009
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects FE Ordered Logit
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
ln(Own Health) 1.569 1.567 1.567 0.902 0.874 0.925 1.510 1.493 1.524
(55.89) (37.51) (41.42) (31.74) (20.57) (24.18) (35.60) (24.10) (26.22)
ln(Reference Health) −0.639 −0.922 −0.595 −0.524 −0.373 −0.697 −1.046 −0.762 −1.344
(3.84) (3.85) (2.44) (3.27) (1.77) (2.88) (3.45) (1.85) (3.01)
ln(Own Income) 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.028 0.025 0.029 0.051 0.047 0.054
(10.00) (6.44) (7.50) (5.39) (3.26) (4.26) (5.93) (3.55) (4.76)
ln(Reference Income) −0.191 −0.133 −0.247 −0.095 −0.124 −0.075 −0.210 −0.277 −0.165
(7.13) (3.36) (6.77) (1.90) (1.75) (1.07) (2.21) (1.98) (1.27)
Number of Observations 101, 050 47, 459 53, 591 101, 050 47, 459 53, 591 221, 870 100, 449 121, 421
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03
Number of Individuals 19, 270 9, 267 10, 003
Note: Robust (absolute) t-statistics are in parentheses. Life Satisfaction (dependent variable) is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with a mean and
standard deviation of 7.49 and 1.49, respectively. Reference Health and Reference Income are defined as cell means given by age, gender, education,
geographical region, and time era (see Section 3.1.1). Other explanatory variables include age and age2, ln(years of education), ln(number of
children), government (non-income) support expenditures, an unemployment dummy, a couple (married) dummy, a single parent dummy, a dummy
for couples with children under the age of 15, and a dummy for couples with independent children. Constant terms are included in models. The
main pooled OLS equation also includes a male dummy. FE Ordered Logit estimates are based on the BUC estimator developed by Baetschmann
et al. (2011).
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Appendix A
A1. Reference group not defined by ‘gender ’
Table 2: Life Satisfaction Equatons: Hilda Survey 2001−2009
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects FE Ordered Logit
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
ln(Own Health) 1.569 1.567 1.567 0.901 0.874 0.925 1.510 1.492 1.524
(55.94) (37.52) (41.43) (31.73) (20.57) (24.17) (35.56) (24.07) (26.19)
ln(Reference Health) −1.049 −1.243 −0.802 −0.776 −0.797 −0.735 −1.509 −1.611 −1.372
(4.99) (4.05) (2.81) (3.67) (2.92) (2.38) (3.68) (3.03) (2.36)
ln(Own Income) 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.028 0.025 0.029 0.051 0.047 0.054
(9.99) (6.46) (7.50) (5.39) (3.26) (4.26) (5.93) (3.55) (4.76)
ln(Reference Income) −0.186 −0.140 −0.224 −0.075 −0.066 −0.089 −0.179 −0.161 −0.202
(6.73) (3.50) (5.90) (1.36) (0.87) (1.13) (1.68) (1.08) (1.36)
Number of Observations 101, 053 47, 462 53, 591 101, 053 47, 462 53, 591 221, 876 100, 455 121, 421
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03
Number of Individuals 19, 270 9, 267 10, 003
Note: Robust (absolute) t-statistics are in parentheses. Life Satisfaction (dependent variable) is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with a mean
and standard deviation of 7.49 and 1.49, respectively. Reference Health and Reference Income are defined as cell means given by age, education,
geographical region, and time era. Other explanatory variables include age and age2, ln(years of education), ln(number of children), government
(non-income) support expenditures, an unemployment dummy, a couple (married) dummy, a single parent dummy, a dummy for couples with
children under the age of 15, and a dummy for couples with independent children. Constant terms are included in models. The main pooled OLS
equation also includes a male dummy. FE Ordered Logit estimates are based on the BUC estimator developed by Baetschmann et al. (2011).
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A2. Reference group not defined by ‘time era ’
Table 3: Life Satisfaction Equatons: Hilda Survey 2001−2009
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects FE Ordered Logit
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
ln(Own Health) 1.573 1.570 1.570 0.900 0.872 0.923 1.510 1.488 1.520
(56.01) (37.63) (41.44) (31.69) (20.54) (24.15) (35.52) (24.03) (26.18)
ln(Reference Health) −1.226 −1.743 −1.283 −0.911 −1.306 −0.550 −1.852 −2.751 −1.117
(5.45) (4.83) (3.94) (3.25) (3.51) (1.33) (3.45) (3.77) (1.48)
ln(Own Income) 0.057 0.057 0.054 0.028 0.025 0.029 0.050 0.046 0.053
(9.26) (6.10) (6.79) (5.32) (3.21) (4.21) (5.84) (3.48) (4.69)
ln(Reference Income) 0.022 0.119 −0.064 0.048 0.077 0.018 0.090 0.153 0.027
(0.55) (1.86) (1.15) (0.95) (1.11) (0.24) (0.94) (1.12) (0.21)
Number of Observations 101, 057 47, 462 53, 595 101, 057 47, 462 53, 595 221, 900 100, 455 121, 445
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03
Number of Individuals 19, 270 9, 267 10, 003
Note: Robust (absolute) t-statistics are in parentheses. Life Satisfaction (dependent variable) is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with a mean
and standard deviation of 7.49 and 1.49, respectively. Reference Health and Reference Income are defined as cell means given by age, gender,
education, and geographical region. Other explanatory variables include age and age2, ln(years of education), ln(number of children), government
(non-income) support expenditures, an unemployment dummy, a couple (married) dummy, a single parent dummy, a dummy for couples with
children under the age of 15, and a dummy for couples with independent children. Constant terms are included in models. The main pooled OLS
equation also includes a male dummy. FE Ordered Logit estimates are based on the BUC estimator developed by Baetschmann et al. (2011).
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